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Wonder, Touch, and Subjectivity in Scève’s Délie. 
 
In Maurice Scève’s expression of awe, ‘Admirant sa mirable merveille’ (Dizain 7, l. 
6)1 there may be a trace of Plato’s ‘utterly beautiful and amazing’ agalma aretes 
(Symposium 217a), the wondrous source of desire.2 In the Symposium, moreover, 
these are ‘images of virtue’ (222a): so, for both Alcibiades and Scève’s poet-lover, is 
the beloved the ‘objet de plus haulte vertu’? For Aristotle, wonder initiates inquiry.3 
For Descartes likewise: it is the first of his ‘passions’, it ‘alters the subject’s intimacy 
but reveals it at the same time’,4 and triggers the desire for virtue.5 Philosophy, virtue, 
and this love poetry all begin with the affect and effect of wonder. However, 
1 All references are to Maurice Scève, Délie: object de plus haulte vertu, ed. by 
Gérard Defaux, 2 vols (Geneva: Droz, 2004). 
2 Plato, Symposium, trans. by Christopher Gill (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1999), p. 
56. 
3 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. by W. D. Ross (Adelaide: University of Adelaide, 
2015):  ‘For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to 
philosophize’ (Book 1, 2). 
<https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/metaphysics/book1.html> [accessed 21 
December 2015]. 
4 Catherine Malabou, ‘Go Wonder: Subjectivity and Affects in Neurobiological Times’ 
in Adrian Johnston and Catherine Malabou, Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, 
Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), p. 9. 
5 See René Descartes, Les Passions de l’âme, ed. by Benoît Timmermans (Paris: 
Livre de Poche, 1990), §s 69-75, pp. 84-88. 
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philosophical inquiry traditionally severs itself from affect, although without 
wonder’s alteration thinking may not begin. Scève and Plato are uneasy companions, 
for Plato requires a choice between philosophy and love, and seems no lover of poetry. 
Petrarch, then, may be more compatible when embarking on a poetic venture into love 
and knowledge. Yet the Délie starts with wonder, marking an initial difference 
between the Délie and the Canzoniere. The Petrarchan tropes which abound in 
Scève’s text do not place wonder in pole position, and if Scève’s narrative begins with 
the innamoramento, his version also differs from Petrarch’s in its emphasis on love’s 
touch as much as its look. 
The long textual prehistory of that look of love returns us to Plato and 
Aristotle, via, among others, Marot, Ficino, and Augustine. Familiarity with such 
intertexts may make Scève’s text more accessible,6 but its relationship with its 
precursors feels peripheral to our enjoyment. Take Dizain 231’s opening lines: ‘mes 
deux flancs malades’ (l. 2) echoes Ovid’s trope of the body sick with love, and there 
is a trace of Ficino’s vital spirits in ‘mortelz espritz’ (ibid); the sighs and tears of the 
martyr to love, ‘mon grief martyre’ (l. 1), are familiar from both Petrarch and 
troubadour poets. Yet these are mere footings for what is exciting in the dizain: the 
6 See, for instance, the editions of the text by I. D. McFarlane (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1966) and Defaux, and, to name just a few of the studies that 
illuminate this dimension, Doranne Fenoaltea, ‘The Final Dizains of Scève’s Délie 
and the Dialogo d’Amore of Sperone Speroni’, Studi Francesi, 59 (1976), 201-25; 
François Rigolot, ‘L’Intertexte du dizain scèvian’, Cahiers de l’Association 
Internationale des Études Françaises, 32 (1980), 93-106; and JoAnn DellaNeva, Song 
and Counter-Song: Scève’s ‘Délie’ and Petrarch’s ‘Rime’ (Lexington: French Forum, 
1983).  
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lexis of affect, the working through of the radical consequences of a passion that 
begins with wonder’s blinding flash. No moping Petrarchan lover, this poet-lover 
battles his way to an uncanny new knowledge of his being: ‘de moy je m’espouvante’ 
(l. 10). Conventional sighs and tears are ‘trop desgoustément fades’ (l. 5), insipid and 
disgusting; worse, hope arrives to reduce him to ‘perplexité’ and ‘anxieté’ (ll. 7, 9). 
Out of this disorientation insight emerges. With horror he confronts his – disgusting, 
undead (‘mortelz espritz’) – core, his mortality. ‘Perplexité’, ‘anxieté’, ‘desgoust’, 
and ‘espouvanter’: this is a new poetics of affect, speaking of a version of subjectivity 
more visceral and dissonant than love lyric’s accustomed forms.  
Unsurprisingly, the Délie’s initial dizains attract critical attention;7 it all 
begins with that look, and the poet-lover here has been described as ‘tout œil’.8 Eyes, 
look, gaze, and vision are fundamental to this representation; these inherited tropes 
speak of the values of love lyric and their philosophical underpinnings. The work of 
vision is ‘the meeting of subject and object’:9 this neat abstraction reminds us of 
vision’s significance beyond lyric’s representation of love (subject encounters object 
7 See for instance Lance K. Donaldson-Evans, ‘Love’s Fatal Glance: Eye Imagery in 
Maurice Scève’s Délie’, Neophilologus, 62 (1978), 201-11, and Terence Cave, 
‘Scève’s Délie: Correcting Petrarch’s Errors’, in Pre-Pléiade Poetry, ed. by Jerry C. 
Nash (Lexington: French Forum, 1985), pp. 111-24. 
8 Hans Staub, Le Curieux Désir: Scève et Peletier du Mans, poètes de la connaissance 
(Geneva: Droz, 1967), p. 37. 
9 See Suzanne Conklin Akbari, Seeing Through the Veil: Optical Theory and 
Medieval Allegory (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), p. 22. 
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of desire).10 After Plato, in Western philosophy vision can seem synonymous with 
knowing (subject ‘sees’ object of knowledge), which may give vision particular 
credence in this text saturated with the desire to know the beloved and the ‘truth’ of 
love.11  
Despite familiar tropes and prevalent mood, the text remains challenging. If in 
the thick of the Délie’s obscurities we derive some clarity from vision, thereby 
implicitly settling the narrative within certain traditions, this may be at the expense of 
its specifics: vision’s touch and association with wonder. In Petrarch’s Canzoniere it 
is love’s arrows that open the attack: Laura’s eyes bind him (Sonnet 3), but only later 
will they assault (Sonnet 39), strike, and wound him (Sonnet 75); her gaze is initially 
more benign.12 The Délie’s emphasis on Délie’s (deadly) gaze’s tactile (piercing, 
penetrating) force brings new questions about the nature of embodiment and about 
perception, emotion, and cognition into the narrative, as does the affect of wonder (in 
Dizains 2 and 7). Wonder and touch are interesting in their own right; so, too, is the 
relationship between them. After all, touch’s associations with the body and 
contiguity seem in tension with wonder’s distal, disembodied qualities.  
How does the moon that is the beloved (source of light and, indirectly, 
reflection) become ‘infuse dans mes veines’ (Dizain 22, l. 7), or astonish his soul: 
10 David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1976) explores the long history of the subject. 
11 For a survey of the persistent ocularcentrism of Western thought and art see Martin 
Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
12  F. Petrarca, Canzoniere , ed. by G. Contini (Einaudi: Turin, 1964) 
<http://www.letteraturaitaliana.net/pdf/Volume_2/t319.pdf> [accessed 26 May 2016]. 
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‘M’estonna l’Ame’ (Dizain 6, l. 6)? Such metaphors belong to established narrative, 
philosophical, and figural conventions originating in early Greek philosophy and 
optics. We could also read instances of vision’s touch as purely figurative. But are 
they? Their occurrence suggests an interest in embodied experience and 
understanding that vision, sight, or the gaze alone do not foster, and which remains 
largely unexplored by scholars.13 For instance, the eye’s penetrating action is a form 
of touch whose violent effects exceed the vestiges of Platonist theories of sight and 
the familiar topoi of Petrarchan poetry relating to the innamoramento, and what 
Donaldson-Evans names the ‘aggressive eye topos’.14 His interpretation illuminates 
the force of the gaze, but not its tactile nature, or the conceptualization of the body 
that subtends Scève’s development of the trope: for Donaldson-Evans, Délie as 
‘l’Idée’, Idein (she who is seen) prevails (see 206).15  
The authoritative Aristotelian hierarchy of the senses inherited by sixteenth-
century humanists established vision’s distance from touch; the former is associated 
with mind and spirit, the latter with the body. Vision holds the privilege of distance; 
touch, the problem of contiguity. So what if vision and touch are contiguous – a 
13 Dizain 291’s thematization of the limits of visual representation suggests a desire 
for a poetics of sensation and perception beyond the visual. See Ann Rosalind Jones 
and H. Bruce von Ohlen, ‘“Si doulx et attrayant subject”: Scève’s Délie and Four 
Modern Critics’, Romanic Review, 68 (1977), 85-102 (p. 101). 
14 See ‘Love’s fatal glance’, p. 201.  
15 Notable exceptions to a tendency in studies of the Délie to focus on abstraction and 
ascesis are Simone Perrier, ‘A la recherche d’un corps imaginaire’, Cahiers Textuels, 
34 (1987), 27-33, and Thomas Hunkeler, Le Vif du sens: corps et poésie selon 
Maurice Scève, (Geneva: Droz, 2003). 
 
                                                        
6  
piercing or wounding look? We may declare the adjective metaphorical, but its 
associations with sensation and fleshy matter do not dematerialize. The part played in 
the Délie by touch and the versions of embodiment it evokes is not congruous with 
many of its intertexts, least of all those informed by Ficino’s disembodied 
Neoplatonism. When Petrarchan and other love lyric arcs from the sensual to the 
spiritual, justifying love as a gateway to transcendent truth, here the body, and with it, 
touch persist. Embodied desire may be dramatized by the poet-lover’s bitter 
complaint against ‘aimer honnestement’ (Dizain 41, l. 5) which embargoes touch, or 
accepted: witness the final dizain’s ‘peu de difference | Entre l’ardeur […] | Et la vertu’ 
(Dizain 449, ll. 5-7). Affect, thought, and embodiment seem to remain interrelated, as, 
ultimately, the juniper remains rooted in earth (‘Nostre Genevre […] vivra’ (Dizain 
449, l. 9)). To trace this through from beginning to end is beyond the reach of this 
discussion; its focus is primarily on early dizains and their staging of both wonder and 
touch, and on significant instances of touch’s later recurrence. 
 
‘Sa poingnant’ veue’ 
As Dizains 2, 6, and 7 insist, wonder transfixes and transforms the (future) poet-lover, 
who declares: ‘M’estonna l’âme’ (Dizain 6, l. 6), ‘tellement tient mes esprits ravis, | 
En admirant sa mirable merveille’ (Dizain 7, ll. 5-6).16 Conventionally, wonder 
surprises the subject into having a feeling about himself and into thinking about what 
he is feeling; the advent / event of wonder holds feeling and thinking together, but 
will give thinking priority. Here, instead, we find embodied thinking, through which 
16 Dizain 7 includes all six of what will be the Cartesian ‘passions de l’âme’: wonder, 
love, hate, desire, joy, and sadness. 
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affect and desire pulse: for instance, ‘Je me dissous en ioyes, & en pleurs’ (Dizain 4, l. 
10). Already by the end of Dizain 6, her beauty has astonished him into enslavement 
and new awareness of his mortality. Wonder’s association with touch (via the 
‘poingnant’ veue’) and therefore with contiguity and the flesh forces it away from the 
purity and distance associated with vision, and raises questions bearing, not least, on 
the relationship between ‘l’ardeur’ and ‘la vertu’. What form of desire for truth and 
knowledge is prompted by this encounter with the beloved?  
Because of its associations with knowledge since Antiquity, vision has tended 
to operate as the underlying structure of Western subjectivity.17 To rethink the 
relationship between vision and touch is to allow a different version of both 
subjectivity and knowledge. This is evident in the work of feminist thinkers such as 
Luce Irigaray and Rosi Braidotti, and recent theorists of haptics,18 and, in the field of 
early modern studies, in Elizabeth Harvey’s Sensible Flesh,19 a collection of essays 
exploring ‘how tactility has organized knowledge and defined human subjectivity’ (p. 
2). My ambit is more limited: the poetic valence of touch, and its powerful ambiguity 
as sensation, emotional resonance, or both. Vision may have been that ‘underlying 
structure’ for Scève and his poetic predecessors. His poems do not displace vision so 
17 On the concepts inherited by sixteenth-century thinkers, see for instance Akbari, 
Seeing Through the Veil, chapters 1 and 2. 
18 See, for example Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Mille Plateaux: capitalisme et 
schizophrénie (Paris: Minuit, 1980), and Laura U. Marks, The Skin of the Film: 
Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment and the Senses (Durham NJ: Duke University 
Press, 2000). 
19 Sensible Flesh: On Touch in Early Modern Culture, ed. by Elizabeth Harvey 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003). 
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much as explore ways in which, just as love disrupts the desire for ‘pure’ knowledge, 
so vision is unsettled by contiguity with touch (and hence, flesh), and contiguity 
(touch’s mode) competes with distance (sight’s prerogative, along with hearing’s). 
That vision and touch lean on each other suggests the coexistence of different 
conceptualizations of the relationship between body and mind, sense and intellect. 
Touch’s pivotal presence becomes clearer if we add to it and to wonder two other 
initial key terms: the wound and wandering.  
Enter the careless wanderer – the aimless, not-yet-thinking subject. A 
metonymic eye (the first word of the first dizain) represents his being; however, this 
eye is far from aligned with mind, knowledge, or insight. The beloved-to-be’s gaze 
transforms him: her beauty will reveal his mortality to him in a blinding flash 
(Dizains 6 and 7). He will lose his illusory bearings – which have their basis in a 
fantasy of being whole and intact. For not only does her gaze penetrate and wound 
him: ‘sa poingnant’ veue […] | Vint penetrer’ (Dizain 1, ll. 4-6); it (therefore, she) 
awakens him to his previously unacknowledged dejected dark core: ‘plus m’allume et 
plus, dont m’esmerveille, | Elle m’abysme en profondes tenebres’ (Dizain 7, ll. 9-10). 
Much later, he returns to this, in that moment of self-horror: ‘de moy je m’espouvante’ 
(Dizain 231, l. 10). This is the price of becoming the poet-lover, a man of words, but 
initially, it remains a source of wonder; it is not yet horror, but tinged with 
incoherence and anxiety.  
Initially, his sense of embodied being, awakened by her beauty and his desire, 
is stylized as ‘Corps, Coeur, Raison’ (Dizain 1, l. 5), voice (Dizain 5), sight, and all 
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his other senses.20 However, a more idiosyncratic representation will develop. I shall 
pursue the analysis of embodiment shortly, but first shall focus on what emerges in 
the early dizains where the unorthodox presence of touch unsettles familiar tropes and 
structures.  
Where correspondence or consonance had operated between ‘physiology’ and 
‘psychology’ and between texts, here, dissonance and gaps seem to prevail, whether 
in the conventionalized disjunction (therefore heuristic conjunction), between her 
beauty (therefore goodness) and her cruelty or ambiguity: ‘ton oeil cruellement benin’ 
(Dizain 372, l. 3), or in terms of his own embodied being, as the contrast between the 
heady wandering of the first dizain and the confused wanderings of Dizain 164 
suggests. Both dizains represent intense emotion, but the latter conveys the effects of 
being subject to excessive pleasure and pain beyond enduring. Here he is submerged 
in love’s fathomless turmoil (‘Gouffre amer’ (l. 3)), dying of love (‘je perissois’ (l. 
8)); wandering no longer connotes light-heartedness but evokes the wave-driven drift 
of a corpse: ‘Comme corps mort vaguant en haute Mer […] | J’errois’ (ll. 1-3). His 
feelings are so conflicted – now hope, now bitter despair – that: ‘Tout estourdy point 
ne me congnoissoys’ (l. 10). Anxiety, love, acute awareness of mortality are 
dislocated from a body, which signifies, instead, as the denaturalized body of analogy 
(‘Comme corps mort vaguant en haute Mer’ (l. 1)) – an analogy, moreover, derived 
20 On the apparent – culturally orthodox – correspondence between physiology and 
psychology in the text, see Jean Céard, ‘Sens, coeur, raison, mémoire dans Délie: la 
psychologie de Scève’, Cahiers Textuels, 34 (1987), 15-25. 
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from an existing prestigious source (Virgil, Aeneid, III, ll. 192-208),21 thus markedly 
removed from specific embodied existence. The body’s lifelessness is at odds with the 
poet-lover’s turbulent passions, and his capacity to understand what he feels is adrift 
from those feelings. The mere sound of her name (‘Soubdain au nom d’elle’ (l. 7)) 
casts him from inertness into a state of confusion magnified by ‘estourdy’’s 
contradictory connotations of both turbulence and numbness.22 However, to drift free 
from the overwhelming corporeal experience of desire results in loss of being. The 
first-person subject pronoun appears only twice, with the verbs ‘errer’ and périr’; the 
dizain’s last words of self-loss ‘point ne me congnoyssois’ enact this through their 
elision of pronominal identity. If his beloved holds out hope to him, he does not 
recognize that hope as his; if his feelings seem tempestuous, at their heart, the last 
line’s self-estrangement implies, is a void.  
Dissonance, breach, and wound: such is the embodied subjectivity precipitated 
by the touch of love together with its more visual element, the gaze. The gaze arouses 
wonder, while touch animates awareness of embodiment, acting simultaneously as 
both a bridge and a severance: a bridge between thought, feeling, and a form of 
corporeality, but a severance from both the organic and symbolically mediated body. 
If this poet-lover represents his experience of love more viscerally than his 
predecessors, this still offers only a simulacrum of unmediated, organic corporeality. 
21 P. Vergili Maronis Æneidos Liber Tertius <http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/vergil/aen3.shtml> [accessed 26 May 2016]. 
22 See Randle Cotgrave, A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues (1611), 
<http://www.pbm.com/~lindahl/cotgrave/search/410r.html> [accessed 23 March 
2016]. 
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The tempest analogy represents the effects of passionate desire, which disturbs 
the poet-lover’s illusion of having a body that is unified and intact, representable 
simply and adequately as ‘Corps’. It also conveys the extremity of the disorientation 
and disillusionment experienced: less an expression of an inner emotional state than a 
suggestion of radical loss of an identity which could still be imagined as being 
spatially boundaried, for the tempest both engulfs him and surges inside him. Not that 
the ‘outside’ expresses the ‘inside’; this would presume conceptually inappropriate 
models of meaning, such as a depth model or a correspondence model, resting on the 
notion that inner emotion precedes expression. Instead, here the embodied self is 
produced and experienced as an effect of the intensities of desire, the movements of 
which produce the effect of depth or interiority, rather than emanating from them. 
Scève captures acutely, firstly, the unpredictable simultaneity of articulation / 
gesture, and emotion, and understanding, or the disjunction between them. Second, 
while the poet-lover laments his loss of self and orientation, and feels imperilled, we 
may read this loss as a movement from one form of wandering to another, not a loss 
of self so much as a painful realization of the illusory nature of his former coherence. 
Peril may produce painful / transformative lucidity. 
This is not a recovery of a more immediately experienced embodiment; rather, 
it is a recognition of the already denaturalized nature of embodied human ‘nature’. 
This, or so my argument goes, is a form of the work done by touch in this text’s 
rewriting of love’s tropes and structures, as readings of a number of dizains will 
demonstrate. At stake are not only the touch of love’s look but also other instances of 
touch, as both sensation and affect. However, touch’s violent occurrence at the outset, 
which is so different from the beginning of Petrarch’s representation, has dramatic 
significance in the context of that ‘essential’ trope, the look of love. Where the look 
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had become familiar, its figurative deadly power bypassing questions of embodied 
subjectivity and instead, privileging re-presented emotions, now look’s touch, and 
with it, fleshy associations, bring embodiment back into play, together with questions 
about the physiology of vision and its relationship with desire: still questions today, if 
currently for neuroscience quite as much as for a range of art forms. 
 
The touch of love 
Aristotle’s De Anima and De Sensu informed the conceptualization of sensation 
inherited by Scève’s generation. Contributions over time by philosophers both pagan 
and Christian (including Plato, Plotinus, Stoics, Augustine, and Boethius) built on 
Aristotle’s categorizing approach, and his hierarchy of the senses remained constant. 
Eye and ear, the supposedly more distal senses, took precedence. The remaining three 
– smell, taste, and last, touch – followed, as more proximate sensations, judged bound 
to the body. Yet touch was valued as the first sense to form in utero, and as necessary 
for survival;23 and, paradoxically, as a preeminent source of information about the 
material world, a source of precision, in which ‘we far excel all other species in 
exactness of discrimination’,24 despite being the most diffuse of sensations, in its 
physiological location and as experienced – as theorists of haptics remind us.25  
23 Aristotle, De Anima, trans. by J. A. Smith, Book III, 12, 434b 
<http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Aristotle/De-anima/de-anima3.htm> [accessed 7 
August 2015].  
24 De Anima, Book II, 9, 421a. 
25 See, for instance, Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory 
Media (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) and Mark Paterson, 
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The gap between eye and touch is clear in Ficino’s Neoplatonism: ‘de ses six 
puissances de l’ame [he includes reason], trois y en a qui appartiennent au corps & 
matiere, sçavoir est, l’attouchement, le gout & le sentiment, & les trois aultres, 
asçavoir raison, le [sic] veue, & l’ouye, à l’esprit’.26 Scève’s representation is not 
dualist; while aspects of Neoplatonism run through the Délie, it does not end in 
Neoplatonist transcendence; touch is neither denigrated nor a stable signifier. 
Moreover, as the beloved’s ‘chair tendre’ (Dizain 237, l. 3) reminds us, as does the 
violent fantasy of her, naked in her husband’s arms allowing his touch: ‘Hà […] il la 
touche’ (Dizain161, l. 5), the body from which Ficino seeks distance is the erotic 
body, desired and desiring flesh. Touch and sex went hand in hand in theories of 
sensation.  
 Whatever the limits of Aristotle’s ideas – an inadequate contact theory, 
constrained by available physiological models – they still set the agenda, not least 
touch’s inferiority by association with contiguity, in contrast to distal sight. 
Contiguity bespeaks intimacy and moreover, erroneously, an immediacy that vision 
lacked. Distance was identified with clear and distinct perception and thence 
understanding, but touch as a means of collapsing distance was, nonetheless, valued 
by some theorists after Aristotle. This supposedly unmediated aspect shaped touch’s 
Touch: Haptics, Affects and Technologies (London: Bloomsbury, 2007). The range of 
interest galvanized by virtual reality and information technology is too vast to do 
other than indicate here. 
26 Marsilio Ficino, Le Commentaire de Marsille Ficin, Florentin: sur le Banquet 
d’Amour de Platon: faict Francois par Symon Sylvius, dit J. de la Haye, (Poitiers, 
1546), Oraison Cinquiesme  chap. II, xxxviii vº-xl vº, cited in Délie, ed. by Defaux, II, 
394-95. 
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later function as a source of certainty, supplementing sight – witness Doubting 
Thomas. This is not its significance in the Délie, however: no sensation (touch or 
other), no thinking or reasoning, offers certain understanding or material proof of the 
meaning of the poet-lover’s experience of love and desire, except in its dislocated, 
dislocating instances, such as the marital coupling which stings him (‘Je me voultre 
en l’Ortie’ (Dizain 161, l. 3)) into viscerally certain awareness of his abject suffering.  
This absence of fixed meaning is enhanced by the diffuseness of touch: the 
organ of touch is skin, or more precisely flesh, rather than a precise orifice such as the 
eye; it is experienced diffusely over the skin’s surface at the same time as at the point 
of contact.27 This diffuseness maps seamlessly onto the – untouchable – beloved, who 
in the poet-lover’s representations has no centre but is all centre, as well as being 
centre of, and everywhere in, his world. Moreover, touch is both sensation and source 
of affect, for example: ‘Touchant sa chair precieusement vive’ (Dizain 349, l. 3), ‘Qui 
si au vif iusques au coeur me touche’ (Dizain 233, l. 4), and ‘Ie cours à moy, quand 
mon erreur me touche’ (Dizain 57, l. 3). It also conveys the eye’s agency, the 
‘poingnant’ veue’ that penetrates his soul. The part touch plays in this look of love – 
poingnant’, perçant, penetrer – violently dramatizes the desire to enter, get under the 
skin, to reach, and thereby know – or so some fantasize – the ‘innermost’ being 
(‘l’Ame de mon Ame’ (Dizain 1, l. 6)).  
 
27 However remote Aristotelian physiology is from twenty-first-century ideas, here 
Aristotle’s thinking resonates with the current view that touch receptors are located 
between dermis and epidermis – somewhat akin to Ambroise Paré’s: ‘le toucher […] 
est faict […] en une peau nerveuse disposee par tout le corps, & mise sous la peau’ 
(Œuvres: Paris, 1633), p. 21. 
 




Cuidant ma dame un rayon de miel prendre, 
Sort une Guêpe, âpre comme la Mort, 
Qui l’aiguillon lui fiche en sa chair tendre 
Dont de douleur le visage tout mort, 
“Ha, ce n’est pas, dit-elle, qui me mord 
Si durement, cette petite Mouche; 
J’ai peur qu’amour sur moi ne s’escarmouche. 
 – Mais que crains-tu? Lui dis-je brièvement, 
Ce n’est point lui, Belle: car quand il touche, 
Il point plus doux, aussi plus grièvement.” (Dizain 237) 
 
In this playful dizain, in a scene perhaps originating in Theocritus’s Idyll XIX,28 in 
which Cupid was stung by a bee, a wasp stings the beloved. A pain so sharp must be 
love’s sting, she fears. In Theocritus’s poem Cupid’s mother, smiling, enlightens him: 
the bee’s sting was like his own. Scève displaces love: it is not Cupid who is stung, 
not love in the form of Venus who knows what’s what. His version plays on the 
homophony of bites and death, ‘Mort’, ‘mord’, and ‘mort’, a verbal confusion setting 
up a dialogue in which the poet-lover is cast as the one who knows – expert in love, 
unlike Délie. Love’s sting is both sweeter and worse than the insect’s, he says; that he 
can differentiate between the two is an example of embodied, affective knowledge.  
28  See Theocritus, Idyll XIX, trans. By J. M. Edmonds 
http://www.theoi.com/Text/TheocritusIdylls1.html [accessed 26 May 2016]. 
 
                                                        
16  
Scève’s retelling plays with love’s knowledge: Theocritus’s themes are 
displaced from mother and son, embodiments of love, onto the beloved and the poet-
lover.29 The dizain combines the theme of recognition and the reader’s pleasure in 
play and recognition enabled by reliable intertexts. That love’s impact (and hence 
knowledge of it) is felt through touch here, is more than a commonplace. In 
Theocritus (and in Strozzi’s and Marot’s versions), Venus smiles or laughs as she 
enlightens her son; here the poet-lover speaks ‘brievement’, concisely, without the 
mollification of a smile. Instead, he emphasizes the paradox that Délie should 
recognize: love’s sting is both sweeter and more pleasant, and more painful than the 
wasp’s. This paradox has little reach, it seems, for Délie will remain apparently 
unmoved by love for many dizains to come. Nor does the ‘Mort’/‘mort’/‘mord’ play 
disturb the reader: no one will really die. What is unsettling here is the rare focus on 
Délie’s embodiment, her ‘chair tendre’, and her sensual appetite (the honey-thief), 
rather than the poet-lover’s – though he is allowed the veiled expression of his desire 
to sting / touch her, rather than simply speak of it to her.  
Délie’s more abiding associations are with the power of her eyes and her 
presence as a ‘merveilleux spectacle’ (Dizain 97, l. 1), and with her radiance (an 
ascribed quality, diffused over the skin): so far so conventional. Her flesh is only 
explicitly mentioned once more (Dizain 349), in another oblique instance of the poet-
lover’s desire to touch her. This being love-lyric, we read more about the poet-lover’s 
self-preoccupation than about the beloved’s attributes, other than largely symbolic 
surface detail: eyebrows, occasionally mouth, and above all, eyes, with their divine 
and deadly power. Her presence may be more than surface, but if she has a mind and 
heart, that heart is, crucially, ‘impenetrable’ (Dizain 330, l. 1) – unlike his. 
29 See Defaux, Délie, II, 276-77. 
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Occasionally physical details feature, but what matters is their absence. If Délie 
(even) has a body, it is not her own: there is no distracting matter, only an absence in 
keeping with his desire – for what is absent. Her represented ‘body’ is primarily an 
empty space for his desire to fill, constructed by his desire (as well as by all the poetic 
intertexts which echo intermittently here) – a reminder, if we think back to the body 
represented in Dizain 164, that the embodied self is produced and experienced – as an 
effect of the intensities of drives and desire, whose pulses produce the effect of depth 
or interiority.  
By contrast, the poet-lover seems strongly embodied. Senses, heart, mind, and 
memory are recurrent aspects of his psycho-physiological representation – apparently 
a symbolic, somewhat dematerialized body, corresponding to states of mind and 
feeling. Nevertheless a more organic, though no less imaginary, body makes its 
presence felt in references to the poet-lover’s neck, breast, armpit, hips, flank, and 
pulse, blood, veins, kidneys, entrails, bones, skin, and bones piercing skin. Several of 
these organic substances offend the conventional poetics of the body in love lyric; 
moreover, this is not a simple correspondence of outside and inside, or the clear 
antithesis of her impenetrability and untouchability. While she, ‘celestement humaine’ 
(Dizain 372, l. 7), epitomizes an ideal whereby the body seems not to encumber the 
soul, his embodiment persists, neither neatly corresponding to pre-existing codes, nor 
as a stable site of identity. The body is wounded, assaulted (Dizain 206), breached, 
penetrated, suffocated, hyperaroused; sweating, fevered, itching, weeping … an 
imperilled body, ‘violenté’ (Dizain 398, l. 1). Terms – such as ‘fiebvre’ – have 
interchangeably literal and figurative functions, unpredictably conflating bodily states, 
emotional turmoil, and metaphor. Imaginary the body may be, but its corporeality is 
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abiding, even while written over by language, in a representation of which 
discrepancy or gap rather than correspondence is the mark.  
A late dizain, 439, presents an analogy between the poet-lover’s sense of self 
and a sponge. It draws on Speroni’s Dialogo,30 in which the lover wants to be fused 
with the beloved like water in a sponge. Scève’s poet-lover (not Speroni’s generalized 
‘lo amante’) absorbs Speroni’s sponge image, and gives it a more aggressive twist 
than is already implicit in a verb such as ‘pénétrer’ (l. 4): 
 
Alimenté est le sens du doux songe 
De vain plaisir, qui en tous lieux m’entame, 
Me penetrant comme l’eau en l’éponge, 
Dedans lequel il m’abysme et me plonge, 
Me suffoquant toute vigueur intime. (ll. 2-6) 
 
As a variation on the theme of the struggle between flesh and spirit, Scève’s version 
dwells more on and in the body than does its source. Speroni’s expression of desire 
(for libidinous desire to be quashed for the spirit to ascend free), quickly moves from 
desire to penetrate the beloved to his point of comparison, whereas here embodiment 
persists, as befits sticky desire (‘desir si glueux’ (Dizain 276, l. 5)). The force and 
physicality of the verbs conveying desire’s overwhelming power, ‘penetrer’ and 
‘abysmer’, are freighted with resonances which accumulate across the Délie.31 
30 See Defaux, II, 473-74, and Fenoaltea, ‘The final dizains of Scève’s Délie, pp. 215-
16. 
31 Parts of the verb ‘penetrer’ occur twelve times, and of ‘abysmer’ or ‘s’abysmer’, 
seven times across the text. 
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Suffocation, penetration, a sponge dramatize the defenceless permeability of the 
embodied subject; suffocation and penetration convey a tactile, biomaterial 
representation of corporeality, perhaps – but he is cut off from that matter even when 
it ‘feels’ acutely his, and it also lacks coherent narrative or linguistic identity. In 
contrast both to Délie – a surface, or collection of symbolic details – and to prevailing 
representations of the body as a stable array of symbolic attributes, and also in 
contrast to the distance upheld between subject and object when vision is primary, 
here the poet-lover’s embodied identity is marked by the dissolution of its 
presupposed boundaries, as effected and figured by the touch of love, which breaches 
the imaginary enclosure of the body, penetrating both heart and soul. Even when, 
initially, Scève works with vision, he brings touch into play; syntactically – the 
‘poingnant’ veue’ of Dizain 1 – and conceptually, vision and touch are contiguous, 
and touch can function as a metaphor for gaining access to what feels as if it is inside, 
conveying both erotic and epistemological desire.  
 
The touch of love: taken by surprise?  
Dizain 237 seems an inconsequential interlude, but it brings home the power of touch. 
Theocritus’s tale culminated in Venus’s comparison between the bee’s sting and 
Cupid’s darts. Here, instead, comparison (between the wasp’s and love’s sting) 
generates the narrative, and now Délie, not Cupid, is the honey-thief – and she is 
already associated with all that is (bitter)sweet. Also, the original comparison has 
become a metaphor; rather than comparing sting and dart, we move from the sting to 
love’s touch which stings (‘poinct’). These conversions attest the secure multivalency 
of touch, denoting now sensation, now affect, or ambiguously both.  
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 The verb chatouiller, to tickle or excite, which occurs six times in the Délie, 
allows us to consider touch and skin, or, as here, tender flesh, together. Both 
meanings of chatouiller are ambiguously literal and figurative, tactile and affective; 
moreover, tickling is a paradigm of eroticized touch. As such, it is worth exploring as 
a potentially illuminating example of early modern epistemologies of the body and 
interest in what can be known via the body in a philosophically problematic state. 
That is, the erotically and passionately enlivened body, which may disrupt habitual 
thought-patterns and object relations and, together with the thoughts inspired by love, 
surprise the poet-lover into new self-understanding. Sixteenth-century debates about 
the reliability of sense-perception imply that humans do not coincide with their 
organic corporeality. Whilst vision allows, and is valued for allowing, the illusion of 
distance between mind and body, touch and being touched acknowledge embodiment 
and invite the illusion of immediate coincidence. In the Délie, chatouiller’s 
ambiguities convey an implied continuity between the sensation and experience of 
eroticized touch and being affected, and also have the capacity to represent that 
physiological and emotional event, which might seem to suggest that ‘Corps, Coeur, 
et Raison’ are experienced as being on a continuum rather than in conflict, even to the 
extent that erotic desire can coexist with virtuous desire: ‘Corps, Coeur, et Raison 
[…][et] l’Ame’. If this is the case, it still remains to explore the complexities, and cost, 
of such embodied and affective thinking. 
The narrative of love begins with the surprise that accompanies wonder: in 
Dizain 6 the poet-lover remembers: ‘l’œil […] | Se veit surpris de la doulce presence | 
Qui par sa haulte, et divine excellence | M’estonna l’Ame, et le sens’ (ll. 3-6). Love 
takes us by surprise. Tickling also surprises in that it may be a first, unexpected 
experience of pleasure becoming too much and thus pain. Poets surprise readers with 
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their use of this verb, giving us the pleasure of exploring which significance prevails: 
tactile or affective – or both? In the Délie, both love and tickling keep surprising: 
there are numerous recurrences and variants of the innamoramento (for instance 
Dizains 1-7, 30, 42, 145, and 147), and numerous instances of chatouiller, each 
unexpected and different. For Scève, as three of these suggest, the vivid connotations 
of this form of touch, used in relation to (vain) hope (Dizain 99), to desire which is 
erotic but also aspires to virtue (Dizain 118), and to emotional pain (Dizain 258), 
accrue, enrich each other, and resonate together over the text’s time and space. Its 
connotations keep body and mind together, and amplify our understanding of the 
experience that the poet-lover is at pains to articulate and thereby understand for 
himself. 
Dizain 99’s mood is bitter: to love is to live certain only of uncertainty; this 
would be suffering enough, were he not to hope against hope for eventual release 
from such ‘fiebvre’ (l. 6) – into what? Certain happiness? Scève here gives a material 
edge to the disease of love topos with a vivid tactile, unpoetic analogy. ‘Je dy, 
qu’espoir est la grand’ prurison | Qui nous chatouille à toute chose extreme’ (ll. 7-8): 
hope is an inflamed rash which drives us, scarcely distinguishing the pain from the 
pleasure of its itch, to the most illusory beliefs – not least, that the pain might end in 
pleasure. Touch in this dizain seems to bear out Aristotle’s identification of it as the 
sensation furthest from mind – but notwithstanding, it functions a source of self-
knowledge. However, in Dizain 118 its relationship with mind and soul has more 
compass and tense ambiguity: 
 
Le hault penser de mes frailes desirs 
Me chatouilloit à plus haulte entreprise, 
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Me desrobant moy mesme à mes plaisirs, 
Pour destourner la memoire surprise 
Du bien auquel l’Ame demoura prise; 
Dont, comme neige au Soleil, je me fondz, 
Et mes souspirs dès leurs centres profondz 
Si haultement eslevent leurs voix vives 
Que, plongeant l’Ame et la mémoire au fondz 
Tout je m’abysme en oublieuses rives. 
 
We might read here a conventionalized struggle between flesh and spirit. However, 
ambiguity sutures the two desires in play: one erotic, one for that which is ‘hault […] 
plus haulte’ – first and last, the ‘plus haulte vertu’ of the text’s title. Chatouiller, to 
excite, yokes body and mind, connects ‘penser’, ‘desirs’, ‘plaisirs’, ‘mémoire’, ‘bien’, 
and ‘Ame’, stimulating both pleasure and the desire to go beyond it, ‘à plus haulte 
entreprise’: this is not dichotomy but continuum, even if that continuum speaks of 
human frailty. However, in lines 6-10 the cost of high aspiration emerges: it leads to 
melting of identity and abyssal loss of self. Set on a continuum with the material 
analogy of snow melting in the sun and the dramatic physicality of such verbs as 
‘plonger’ and ‘s’abymer’, the intimations of ‘chatouilloit’, ‘desrobant’, and ‘prise’ 
(the last two of which point up the more aggressive potential of tickling / exciting) 
become clearer. ‘Prise’, as a term in a sequence of verbs with physical connotations, 
lends material substance to the spirit. The final despairing self-loss reveals what has 
touched (as well as excited) the poet-lover: the glimpse of a continuity between body 
and spirit, realized in erotic love, to depart from which would be violent self-
destruction. The choice of the apparently nonchalant verb ‘chatouilloit’ which plays 
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between ‘pensers’, ‘desirs’, and ‘Ame’ conceals the extent to which the higher, 
virtuous desire does violence to the poet-lover’s embodied being, and also, it is hinted, 
endangers the soul, by capturing it with force, ‘prise’. Freedom from the body (that 
Petrarchan ‘good’), here seems to bring the spirit unfreedom.  
In Dizain 258, by contrast, we are on firmer narrative and tropological ground: 
 
Le Coeur, de soy foiblement resoulu, 
Souffroit asses la chatouillant’ poincture 
Que le traict d’or, fraischement esmoulu, 
Luy avoit fait sans aulcune ouverture. (ll. 1-4) 
 
Cupid’s golden dart (l. 9) pierced the poet-lover’s heart without an entry wound. This 
is an old story, which we could read conventionally, figuratively – despite 
remembering many more instances of his body (with all its organic substance such as 
flank, kidneys, and entrails) being breached and his heart wounded. Nonetheless, the 
adjective ‘chatouillant’ lends the telling more texture, rescuing the body from the hold 
of purely figurative convention, and reminding the reader of the physiological effects 
of love and desire – as do many other dizains (such as 108, 125, and 155) with which 
Dizain 258 thus resonates. This dizain’s unsettling effects reprise the seismic 
disturbance of the first encounter with love. Again it conveys a way of thinking about 
the experience to which the poet-lover is subject (‘souffroit’) that exceeds 
representational conventions, and is one instance among many in which erotic touch 
is both a source of new insight and an acknowledgement that a material, albeit 
mediated, body persists. His countervailing desire for freedom (from love) (ll. 5-8) is 
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no match for it; and there is no mention, even, of will, spirit, or soul in this dizain – 
they are out of the game.  
Despite the different tones of Dizains 118 and 258, in both the touch of love 
involves loss of boundaries. In the latter, the ‘chatouillant’ poincture’ is suffered, and 
in the former, even more radical loss of being: ‘je me fondz’, ‘je m’abysme’. The lack 
of boundaries is echoed in Dizain 439, which represents the lover as a sponge, the 
poet as a sponge in a sea of intertexts, and the poet-lover lost in the deeps of a sea of 
pleasure (only) dreamt of. A puncture-wound penetration becomes fathomless self-
loss; that the wound tickles activates a latent association of the experience of being 
tickled, which takes us to the edge of pleasure. This wound (Dizain 258, l. 4) does not 
penetrate; or does it? The helpless laughter that tickling provokes turns in a split-
second into a tight-chested ache and tears which accompany the switch from pleasure 
to anxious pain. Exciting touch elicits laughter, pain, pleasure-and-pain, and tears 
simultaneous with laughter; touch excites skin, laughter bursts forth, and tears flow in 
a commingling of external and internal breaches of the body’s imaginary boundaries. 
This confusion and threat of excess conveys something of the excitable ambivalence 
with which we may encounter an object of desire. Desire tickles the poet-lover into 
more acute awareness of his corporeality and its relationship with his mind and spirit.  
As the poet-lover in the Délie repeats, love surprises, amazes, and violently 
disorients him, as is evident in the rhetoric of the love-object as the source of both life 
and death, of her being Pandora, of love being sacrificial, of his self-dissolution, and 
her ‘abyssing’ him. These traumatic losses of coherence all originate in the look that 
touches and breaches not his body but his heart (Dizain 5), and in his own desire: ‘la 
clarté de mes desirs funebres’ (Dizain 7, l. 8). So is this a purely metaphorical look 
and touch? Is this a rhetoric which ensures that analogies such as ‘comme Lune infuse 
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dans mes veines’ (Dizain 22, l. 8) make sense? Perhaps; however, the sense of wonder 
that her beauty arouses is more than the pure wonder that prompts not only worship 
but also an intellectual pursuit of truth, for these dizains are punctuated by material-
metaphorical verbs, such as ‘je me dissous’ and ‘elle m’abysme’ as well as by the 
piercing, penetrating look of love. Wonder there is, but the insistent claim of sensate 
being suggests that a different, more embodied form of thinking can now take shape – 
at the same time as the presumed shape of the body is called into question. The body 
which can be represented in terms of being breached or unbreached, firmly substantial 
and bounded rather than dissolving, is a habitual imaginary body, which the encounter 
with desire throws into disarray. The conventionally symbolic ‘Corps, Coeur, et 
Raison […] Ame’ (Dizain 1) are overwhelmed, and overthrown by desire, but the 
physiological body, heart, and brain are none the less affected. The body’s visceral 
register is inseparable from, to take just one example, doubt being experienced as 
‘perilleuse’ (Dizain 220, l. 2) and, when aroused by hope, vacillating (Dizain 362). 
Confronted by the beloved’s unpredictability, the poet-lover agitatedly reels between 
hoping for a welcome and doubting his own hope, unable to believe any evidence he 
may have had of her desire. ‘Le vaciller du doubte’ (l. 10) sends him reeling, and feels 
life-threatening; in the context of a spatially imagined self, this conveys the 
physiological impact on the poet-lover of extreme doubt, at the same time as 
confirming the presence of an imaginary body that is different from its lyric intertexts. 
This poet-lover is particularly preoccupied with the effects of being breached and 
with the realization, prompted by this form of touch, that stability was a fantasy. This 
is not altogether dissonant with the sixteenth-century notion that physiology and 
psychology constitute each other. However, it reminds us that this constitution was 
not metaphor-free, and demonstrates touch’s power (because of its ambiguity as 
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sensation and affect) to unsettle correspondences and contours and, while seeming 
part of that normative model of the convergence of physiology and psychology, to 
reveal an embodiment produced by the intensities of both drives and desires. This is a 
body which is at once material and imaginary, and which signifies. The touch of love, 
be it literal or figurative, surprises us out of our habits and into this awareness, and 
when Scève uses it figuratively, paradoxically, it reactivates the body’s materiality. 
Touch may have been deemed the sensation furthest from imagination and 
memory as well as intellect, but its potential as a source of insight and effective 
means of communicating that insight is strong, and its figurative valence indicates its 
durable potency in both imagination and memory. It is no less potent as a reminder of 
the fluidity and permeability of the body’s boundaries. That the idea of a fixed 
distinction between inside and outside the body is a fiction, indeed is more significant 
as a metaphor than as a physiological or psychological reality, is exemplified by the 
representation of the beloved as impenetrably intact, in contrast to the poet-lover’s 
skin, which breathes.  
The touch of love, be it a look that touches or literally a touch – prohibited and 
therefore constantly fantasized about or yearned for – on or through the skin, is 
integral to the kind of thinking to which love gives rise, in which accustomed 
distinctions and oppositions lose their hold.  
 
Si de sa main ma fatale ennemye 
Et neantmoins delices de mon Ame, 
Me touche un rien, ma pensée endormye 
Plus que le mort soubz sa pesante lame 
Tressaulte en moy, comme si d’ardent flamme 
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L’on me touchoit, dormant profondement. 
Adonc l’esprit, poulsant hors roidement, 
La veult fuyr et moy son plus affin 
Et en ce poinct (à parler rondement)  
Fuyant ma mort, j’accelere ma fin. (Dizain 159) 
 
Touch on skin materializes thought: over the space of three lines, thought’s abrupt 
awakening is described in deliberately corporeal terms, including its elaboration via a 
physical analogy, which simultaneously conjures love’s metaphorical ‘ardent flamme’ 
as well as the sadistic prospect of searing flesh to wake a person. These lines are more 
vigorous than the terms of the paradox which the dizain reprises; the beloved is both 
his heart’s delight and his enemy, but the violence of her effect is nonetheless 
palpable in the last four lines, thanks to the energetic physicality of the description of 
the spirit’s response: ‘poulsant hors roidement | La veult fuyr’. This is both a spirit 
fleeing the body to preserve itself and an embodied spirit, even before the poet-lover 
thinks to join it: again the physicality of the verbs is striking, ‘Fuyant […] j’accelere 
ma fin’. He can neither live with, nor without her; he can save his spirit from the 
deadly lure of the flesh, but die trying; or, muscling both of these to one side, he can 
recognize the aporia that the spirit seems a material phenomenon. This reinvigorates 
the conventional life and death rhetoric of love; this lover’s thinking is embodied and 
he indicates that without love, he imagines he will literally not survive. The vigour of 
this dizain stems from the use of touch, the most inescapably corporeal sense, 
necessary for survival. Paradoxically, it simultaneously reminds us that no matter how 
close the poet-lover comes to the core of things – namely, that love will not save him 
from his dreaded mortality, but, if anything, makes him more acutely aware of it (that 
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comparison between his thinking and the entombed corpse (ll. 3-4) is not for nothing). 
Moreover, there is still a gap between the experience of that core and his real body, 
and touch’s function in the Délie, for all its corporeal associations, is never pure 
bodily gesture or sensation. 
Here the merest touch (‘me touche un rien’ (l. 3)) awakens not senses but 
thought: for Plato and Ficino the senses are entombed in the body; here it is thought 
that lies entombed but for the beloved’s touch. In the opening dizain, it is the touch of 
the sight of the beloved that moves the poet-lover from his wandering (‘mes jeunes 
erreurs’ (l. 1)) to worship and wonder; here it is touch that astonishes. In both, his 
spirit takes flight (‘l’esprit devie’ (Dizain 1, l. 8), ‘l’esprit poussant hors roidement’ 
(Dizain 159, l. 7)). In both, also, touch plays its part in disrupting the poet-lover’s 
sense of himself – surprising him out of deadening habit (the imperfect tense of 
‘girouettoit’ in Dizain 1, or the death-like slumber of his capacity to think in Dizain 
159) – and confronting him with a more dissonant, incoherent version of that self: 
‘Fuyant ma mort, j’accelere ma fin’. 
For Cusa, Bouelles, and Ebreo, whose ideas were attractive to Scève, desire is 
‘an experience that unites man with the world in an effort to comprehend and 
assimilate it’,32 which implies that there is a sense of reliable connection between the 
internal world and the environment – inside and outside. This holds, if we equate the 
beloved with the ‘world’ (as the cosmic symbolism allows), and if we understand 
desire as a coherent force – quite an ‘if’, given the vacillations, confusions, and 
conflict of the poet-lover’s desire. This ‘uniting’ may be a significant aspect of his 
experience of desire, but it does not occur without initial disruption of an existing 
sense of union (wandering is still a form of union) and recurring threats of dislocation, 
32 See Jones and von Ohlen, ‘“Si doulx et attrayant subject”’, p. 93. 
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precariousness, and self-loss: ‘Tout ie m’abysme aux oblieuses rives’ (Dizain 118, l. 
10). Nor does it occur without writing and the kind of creative thinking that poetic 
form and language make possible. For Ann Rosalind Jones and H. Bruce von Ohlen, 
‘Scève is concerned with a poetic savoir which outlasts passing states of confusion 
and wandering precisely because it is validated by them’.33 Perhaps: but that the 
savoir we encounter is embodied seems to have been elided in this statement. This 
becomes more evident if we explore further the relationship between touch and 
wonder – and its concomitants here, confusion and wandering (a form of wondering).  
The poet-lover is and remains a wanderer / in error, and although the causes of 
his wandering / error mutate, his desire is constant. His error is associated with 
isolation and alienation as well as with false belief and self-deception, as in Dizain 57, 
which grows from the realization (‘Je cours à moy’ (l. 3)) that it is his beloved (ll. 5-
8) who misleads him, towards his speechless awareness that he will once again fall 
into self-deception (ll. 9-10). ‘Errer’ connotes primarily existential, psychological, or 
moral / ethical wandering, rather than physical wandering; yet the materiality of verbs 
such as girouetter, courir, and toucher is no accident: the loss of existential or ethical 
compass described brings powerfully felt physical dislocation.  
Between wander and wonder, the hinge is touch: the touch of love incites 
wonder, and the touch of error (‘mon erreur me touche’ (l. 3)) that is wandering 
incites a return to (misplaced or lost) self and with it, a realization of the ‘truth’ of the 
effects of love and desire. Even when the poet-lover then falls back into the self-
blinding ‘error’ of abject devotion, he does so with knowledge – at the cost of wonder. 
Wonder may initiate inquiry, but desire’s knowledge brings only intermittent self-
awareness, as the frequent association of desire and thought now with light, now with 
33 Ibid, p. 102. 
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deadly darkness, or both, suggests: ‘en la clarté de mes desirs funesbres’ (Dizain 7, l. 
8). The object of his desire, the beloved – Délie, ‘comme lune’ (Dizain 22, l. 9) – 
casts both light (associated with wonder – enlightenment) and shadow. On the other 
hand, without desire and love’s knowledge, to wander may be to drift and spin in 
muted existence. This knowledge, painfully won, intermittent, and unreliable though 
it may be (‘le confus de mes vaines merveilles’ (Dizain 164, l. 6)) along the way to a 
place of resolution, is more acutely enlivening and enlightening than the forms of 
knowledge available to the wanderer before his first faltering steps towards becoming 
the poet-lover.  
Before the touch of love, the wanderer lacked wonder – as the insistence on 
surprise, marvel, and admiration (that is, wonder) suggests. However, this form of 
wonder initiates not dispassionate intellectual inquiry but a more problematic and less 
charted exploration / venture. Rather than the poet-lover embarking in hope of 
positive gain (truth or understanding – savoir), he embarks in ambivalence, confusion, 
and self-endangering doubt. For this is embodied wonder and, contrary to both 
philosophical inquiry and the Neoplatonists’ ideal of spiritual transcendence, the poet-
lover’s body will persist (and with it the threat of mortality); mind and body coexist 
even as the very nature of self is thrown into question.  
This helps us understand why the epiphany of the final dizain is so late and 
fragile; the penultimate dizain is riven by doubts about the wisdom of persisting in so 
dangerous and unreasonable a thing as love. But what is the poet-lover’s alternative? 
The versions of what is good and right that ‘raison’ and ‘debvoir’ dictate have lost 
meaning for him, and at least love’s effect has been to awaken a tenacious desire for 
greater understanding and self-understanding – dismantling his sense of identity and 
worth. Lost, too, are the versions of the ideal ending dictated by the genre; here the 
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narrative ends not in spiritual transcendence but in a sense that human love cannot 
reach its greatest spiritual potential without honouring embodied desire.  
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